This is a timely book, re-opening the debate around the political core and the degree of social commitment to be found in classical psychoanalysis, particularly as it emerged in Vienna, Berlin, and Budapest in the period between the two world wars. Danto's thesis is both stimulating and inspiring. Selfreflective disciplines such as psychoanalysis ought to be aware of their own 
upheavals of the 1960's. His heroes, Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, and Herbert Marcuse, each explored the implications of Freud's researches into psychosexuality, each imaginatively elaborating the concept that politics and sexuality were intimately bound together.
In two significant books, Russell Jacoby, first in Social Amnesia (1975) and even more influentially in The Repression of Psychoanalysis: Otto Fenichel and the Political Freudians (1983) writes from the subversive theoretical and political perspective of the Frankfurt School, that is, a form of cultural criticism that polemically opposed non-psychoanalytic and alternative psychologies as conformist; Jacoby's scholarship combines a transparent commitment both to psychoanalytic and Marxist humanism. He bases his research on the 119 letters from the Rundbriefe, the circular letters, largely composed by Fenichel from 1934 Fenichel from to 1945 Fenichel from , and until 1998 Originally discovered on Ralph (Romi)
Greenson's washing machine in Los Angeles, turned over to Jacoby by Randi Markowitz, Jacoby unearthed a treasure trove of archival material, allowing him to reconstruct a secret and lost history of psychoanalytic radicalism, which was repressed after World War II. The letters were sent to a core group that included Edith Jacobson, Annie Reich, Kate Friedlander, Barbara Lantos, Edith Gyomroi, and George Gero, and included Erich Fromm, Martin Grotjahn, and Berta Bornstein on the periphery. This suppression and conservative turn, Jacoby argued, was to be explained by the triple convergence of medicalization, professionalization, and Americanization that not only blunted the subversive edge of these psychoanalytic left-wing intellectuals, but which forced it 4 underground. Though Jacoby privileges the maintenance of an activist theoretical psychoanalysis, he insists that the Fenichel group was a significant, well respected minority within the psychoanalytic mainstream, all of whom wished to avoid Wilhelm Reich's expulsion from the Psychoanalytic International in 1934.They would remain a loyal opposition, not breaking with organizational psychoanalysis, nor distancing themselves from Freud, while cherishing his metapsychology, his clinical methodology, and his basic humanity.
Although Danto lists Robinson's book in her bibliography and cites
Jacoby's Fenichel book in a small number of footnotes, she might have been more generous to her predecessors. More significantly, she missed an opportunity to enter into a discussion with these scholars' path breaking and influential arguments, indicating a continuity in the historiography regarding a politically radical version of psychoanalysis. In writing her history, Danto appears to be taking the stance of standing alone, of discovering a field of inquiry that has not had distinguished precursors. That impression would be inaccurate.
The story of the rise and decline of the free clinics in the period 1918 to 1938 captures the heart and soul of the international psychoanalytic movement from Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, to Zaghreb, Moscow, Frankfurt, Trieste, and Paris. The free clinic movement did not represent a minority on the left, or left opposition within psychoanalysis, but rather the majority social democratic mainstream. Even liberals and apolitical figures in the analytic movement gravitated to the social democratic ideas and aspirations in the period between the wars. For Danto, in short, the free clinics demonstrate the strong progressive impulses at the core of European psychoanalysis in this era.
A narrative within a narrative, the history of the free clinics is largely a story of a broader attempt to democratize medicine and society. Accepting a definition of human beings as social creatures, this second generation of analysts, born around 1900, explicitly designed the free clinics to provide mental health services to those poor and indigent individuals who were excluded from access to psychoanalytic treatment. In effect, this meant treating sectors of the population of the city that one would not ordinarily see in private practice. Hence, the free clinics were formed and sustained by an ethic of the social responsibility of psychoanalysis to the wider community. Very much in line with Austro-Marxist assumptions and the Social Democratic ideology of the inter-war period, the free clinics embodied this social service idealism.
Analysts in Central Europe were politically left, politicized by the First World War, radicalized by the outbreak of social revolutions for a brief moment in 1919 in Hungary, Munich, and Berlin, by the interest generated by the communal experiments of the Kibbutz in Socialist-Zionist circles, and above all, by the impetus for social and sexual experimentation catalyzed by the Russian Revolution. Many embraced an egalitarian community spirit. Psychoanalysis beautifully fit into this model because of its emphasis on sexuality and its attempts therapeutically to free up neurotic individuals from unnecessary sexual misery, to liberate them from chronic psychological unhappiness. The Viennese Social Democrats viewed healthy sexuality as good for the community and as 6 good for workers. Healthy sexuality generally fused with its pro-family orientation. Part of this outlook moved toward gender equality: women were to be as emancipated sexually as were men. Furthermore, children had to be protected within the family framework, the child's right to a safe environment being one of the more revolutionary positions articulated by Julius Tandler and Austrian Social Democracy. One of their slogans beautifully captures the ethic:
"He who builds palaces for children tears down the walls of prisons."
In terms of the actual operation of the free clinics, Danto emphasizes that they were flexible, experimental, and less hierarchical and bureaucratic than our own analytic institutes, contradicting the image of the classical institute as fundamentally formal and rigid, even a paranoid structure. My own view, in agreement with Jacoby, is that a rupture occurred after emigration and World At the free clinics, psychoanalytic technique was safeguarded and preserved, including the reaffirmation of patient privacy and confidentiality; analytic tact was really a code word for compassion and sensitivity to the patients. Trust between analyst and analysand was emphasized, as was establishing rapport with one's patients. Candidates were asked to work at the free clinics for two years without remuneration. In return for their sacrifice, they received broad exposure to the varieties of psychopathology, receiving opportunities for analytic supervision from experienced analysts, often free of charge. They learned developmental perspectives from Anna Freud, August Aichhorn, Willi Hoffer, Siegfried Bernfeld and other analysts who were pioneering 9 methods of both supportive and play therapy in working analytically with children.
The ethos was to respect their clinic patients and to practice with the highest forms of professionalism and seriousness towards them, just as they would treat their higher paying patients in private practice. Critics of psychoanalysis have often commented upon the apparent elitism and exclusionary class biases of analytic practice; the history of the free clinics documents a vast social experiment attempting to universalize analytic treatment, opening it up to all who were in need of its service and expertise.
One of the best aspects of Danto's book is to rehabilitate the life and work of Wilhelm Reich, a figure who has been demonized and pathologized in certain official histories; Reich has sometimes been deleted in recent historical accounts [ Sulloway (1979) , Gay (1988) , and Breger (2000) Reich hoped that case presentations would engender heated clinical debates.
He also had the courage to discuss treatment failures and to present his own clinical work, not fearing the vulnerability that often accompanies such presentations; Reich assumed analysts could learn more about the analytic process by studying errors and blind spots than by exploring successful case histories. The clinical case presentation still persists as an essential part of the teaching methodology at contemporary analytic institutes. Candidates often think of these seminars as unique opportunities to have dialogue about the confusing aspects of analytic clinical work. Clearly for this to function effectively, a safe and trusting situation needed to be optimally created, to enable students to get inside of the elusive clinical process. Reich designed the clinical case conference to explore difficult or intractable patients, which might include investigations into the analysts' counter-transference and analyst discouragement and disappointment.
The free clinics sponsored the treatment of primitive mental disorders, including borderline and psychotic illness, despite the cautionary stance diagnostically about analyzability; in exposing their candidates to a wide variety of psychopathology, psychoanalysis was clearly broadening its scope and practice beyond neurotic disorders. In Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest debates were held about attempts to standardize technique which might rationalize the curriculum of analytic institutes, but which risked the imposition of dogma and rigidity. Others like Ferenczi urged analysts to be spontaneous, warm, alive, and I had no idea that analysts worked for free. I assumed wrongly that such practices were based loosely on an unspoken agreement widely current in the analytic community. Danto corrects this view. Beginning with Freud, she asserts that every analyst saw two candidates for free as part of his or her own practice, in addition to seeing clinic patients for free or low fees; or, if too busy, they would contribute to the clinic through vouchers. Freud donated money collected for his seventieth birthday in 1926 and at other times to the free clinics . In Berlin, analysts affiliated with the Society were expected to contribute 4% of their total income to support the clinic. Wealthy individuals like von Freund, Eitingon, and Marie Bonaparte could not manage to subsidize these expensive ventures without assistance from analytic colleagues.
We know for certain that Freud treated patients for free, including Marianne Kris, Eva Rosenfeld, the Wolfman, and Bruno Goetz. I cannot imagine that he charged his daughter, Anna Freud, when she was in analysis with him, though not much is known of that experience. This set a tone for the entire analytic movement. It is often polemically alleged that Freud did not care about his patients, that he opposed therapeutic zeal because he disliked or was bored by his patients, that he became misanthropic and bitter about human beings as he aged. But contrary evidence exists that he also gave money to patients in need, like the Wolfman, his compassion going well beyond the limits he recommended in the papers on technique.
Freud, it should be said, was no saint. Nor was he particularly sentimental about his fees. From the 1890's on, he treated wealthy patients and charged high fees when he could. During the inter-war period, when Central Europe was hit first by high inflation then by depression, Freud took foreigners into treatment, including Americans, who paid high fees. He apparently operated with a Robin Hood model: taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Freud gave money to people in need, and whether or not they were or had been patients was not of particular concern to him in this respect; his financial generosity was legendary and consistent over several decades; he also pointed out in his self-analysis that his generosity had its roots in the poverty of his early childhood.
Freud had carefully outlined his position on the analyst's fees in "On
Beginning the Treatment" of 1913. There he advises analysts to be candid and unashamed about their fee for services. He urges them not to retreat into prudishness, inconsistency, or hypocrisy regarding payment. Just as he counseled them to be matter of fact in analyzing powerful sexual factors that emerged in treatment situations, so he argued that money had to be dealt with in the same spirit of honesty. Analysts needed money for their self-preservation.
Psychoanalysis was not a philanthropic activity. Patients, Freud said, did not always find that treatment was enhanced if a low fee is asked for and granted.
Analysts were urged to value their time, to bill on a consistent monthly basis, and to function in their own specialty as if they were surgeons, rendering a unqiue and highly skilled service. Furthermore, if analysts were to agree to work for free or for low fees, it would be a tremendous sacrifice on their part, possibly constituting 1/7 or 1/8 of their weekly time and income. Freud anticipated that analysts accepting low fees would resent their patients, possibly feeling exploited by them. Psychoanalysts ought to recognize from the beginning of their training that they would not earn as much as other medical specialties. By implication greed or the wish to amass wealth ought not to be a motivating factor in choosing analysis as a profession.
In his own experiments with treating patients for free, Freud discovered that gratuitous treatment increased a patient's resistances, that it exacerbated Oedipal dynamics, and intensified ambivalence about seeking and receiving help. Moreover, eliminating the fee might remove the relationship too far from the real world, where a patient might lack incentives to terminate the treatment.
Yet, even Freud in his 1913 paper qualified his opposition to free treatment by saying that he had achieved "excellent results" with certain deserving people, that free treatment had been no obstacle to the desired outcome of restored health, efficiency, and improved earning capacity. 
